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To compare the timeliness of nongovernmental and 
governmental communications of infectious disease 
outbreaks and evaluate trends for each over time, we 
investigated the time elapsed from the beginning of an 
outbreak to public reporting of the event. We found that 
governmental sources improved the timeliness of public 
reporting of infectious disease outbreaks during the study 
period.
R
apid public communication of incipient disease 
threats, even with incomplete information, might 
enable quicker response measures, including enhanced 
disease surveillance and initiation of protective measures, 
for those at risk (1). Traditionally, public notiﬁ  cations 
are communicated through a hierarchical infrastructure 
from which local, provincial or state, and national health 
authorities obtain information by interacting with health 
care providers and diagnostic laboratories (2). However, 
many health authorities now rely on informal outbreak-
reporting systems, such as ProMED-mail, for timely signals 
of infectious threats (3,4), as encouraged by the revised 
WHO International Health Regulations (5). Research has 
suggested that globally, informal sources provide outbreak 
warnings faster than traditional governmental reporting 
mechanisms (6). However, existing research of this assertion 
has been limited to disease-speciﬁ   c evaluations (7) or 
descriptive summaries (8). We compared the timeliness of 
initial outbreak communications cited by nongovernmental 
sources to those of governmental sources and examined 
temporal trends in the time from outbreak onset to public 
communication for outbreaks communicated by each 
source, independently.
The Study
The study database consisted of 398 unique human 
infectious disease outbreak events collected from Disease 
Outbreak News, published online by the World Health 
Organization during 1996–2009 (9). For each outbreak, 
we deﬁ  ned the initial source or sources of the ﬁ  rst public 
communication as the individual, organization, or website 
that  ﬁ   rst publicly communicated information regarding 
the disease threat (locally or internationally, orally or 
in writing). The corresponding date of communication 
was identiﬁ  ed by using outbreak reports disseminated by 
ProMED-mail (10). All outbreaks were categorized as 
having been ﬁ  rst communicated by >1 nongovernmental 
or governmental source, or simultaneously by both types 
of sources. When an outbreak was simultaneously ﬁ  rst 
communicated by nongovernmental and governmental 
sources (n = 5), the outbreak was repeated in the dataset and 
each source was given credit. This adjustment increased the 
number of outbreak events to 403.
To characterize the timeliness of outbreak 
communications, for each reporting source of an event, we 
calculated the median time in days, and bootstrapped 95% 
CI, from outbreak start to public communication (Table 1). 
Median reporting times were calculated for the entire study 
period (1996–2009), before and after public recognition 
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (March 12, 
2003), and for each WHO-deﬁ  ned geographic region. The 
effect of the initial reporting source on the timeliness of 
outbreak communication was quantiﬁ  ed by using negative 
binomial regression after adjusting for geographic region 
and whether the outbreak occurred before or after SARS. 
These variables were included in the model on the basis 
of a priori assumptions that public health infrastructure 
can vary by geographic and political region and that 
new pandemic preparedness strategies, including use of 
informal information to initiate public health responses, 
were developed in response to the SARS epidemic (11). 
Interaction terms between each variable were examined but 
were not included in the ﬁ  nal model because none reached 
statistical signiﬁ   cance (p>0.05). Temporal trends were 
assessed by using univariate negative binomial regression 
models, stratiﬁ   ed by source category. These models 
included 1 covariate for the year of outbreak start.
Of all initial outbreak reports identiﬁ   ed, 137 were 
excluded from analysis for ≈1 of the following reasons 
(Figure 1): 117 (85%) of the excluded reports were 
missing information on the estimated outbreak start date; 
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20 (15%) were not found in the ProMED-mail archives; 
and 1 (1%) outbreak estimated start date occurred after 
the date of public communication of the outbreak. Of the 
266 (66%) outbreaks included in analysis, 163 (61%) were 
ﬁ  rst publicly communicated by governmental sources, and 
103 (39%) were ﬁ  rst communicated by nongovernmental 
sources. Chi-square tests showed no signiﬁ  cant differences 
in the proportions of governmental and nongovernmental 
sources included in the analysis versus those excluded (p 
= 0.315).
The median time from estimated outbreak start to 
initial public communication was 10 days shorter for 
nongovernmental sources (23 days, 95% CI 20–32) than 
for governmental sources (33 days, 95% CI 30–45), 
although this difference was not signiﬁ  cant  according 
to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.200) (Table 1). 
Additionally, multivariate modeling showed no signiﬁ  cant 
difference after covariates were adjusted for (incidence rate 
ratio [IRR] 0.95, 95% CI 0.77–1.18) (Table 2). The effect 
of missing data was assessed in sensitivity analyses for all 
outbreaks for which we had an estimated outbreak start 
date (17 of 20). When we used the WHO Disease Outbreak 
News communication date, our results did not change when 
crediting either governmental sources (IRR = 0.88, 95% CI 
0.71–1.09) or nongovernmental sources (IRR = 1.086, 95% 
CI 0.882–1.336).
Examination of temporal trends over the study period 
(Figure 2) showed that nongovernmental sources generally 
communicated outbreak signals to the public faster after 
1996, although the trend did not reach statistical signiﬁ  cance 
(IRR = 0.96, 95% CI 0.91–1.01). Governmental sources, in 
contrast, made signiﬁ  cant improvements in lessening the 
time in which they publicly communicated initial outbreak 
signals (IRR = 0.94, 95% CI 0.91–0.97).
Conclusions
Our data suggest that, from 1996 through 2006, 
outbreaks reported initially by nongovernmental sources 
were communicated publicly an average of 10 days earlier 
than those reported initially by governmental sources. 
Though the differences varied, nongovernmental sources 
tended to report outbreaks faster than governmental sources 
when we compared outbreaks before and after SARS, or by 
WHO-deﬁ  ned region. The lack of statistically signiﬁ  cant 
differences in initial communication timeliness by source 
is probably attributable to a lack of statistical power rather 
than a lack of effect.
Our results also provide support for the International 
Health Regulations 2005 revisions that allow WHO to 
use unofﬁ   cial information to request veriﬁ  cation  from 
member states. Slightly more than one-third of all unique 
infectious disease outbreaks in the WHO Disease Outbreak 
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Figure 1. Exclusion criteria applied to database of 398 outbreak 
events publicly reported through the World Health Organization 
(WHO) Disease Outbreak News during 1996–2009 and breakdown 
of nongovernmental and governmental sources used to compare 
the timeliness of outbreak communications. UN, United Nations. 
*More than one source may be identiﬁ   ed for a given outbreak; 
†categories for exclusion are not mutually exclusive; ‡health 
ofﬁ  cials, ministries of health, laboratories, hospitals, etc.; §included 
in sensitivity analysis; ¶includes nongovernmental organizations, 
individual accounts, ProMED requests for information, and multiple 
sources.
Table 1. Time from the estimated start of an outbreak to its earliest communication by source* 
Variable
Governmental sources  Nongovernmental sources 
p value  No. outbreaks  Median no. days (95% CI)  No. outbreaks  Median no. days (95% CI)
Period            
  1996–2009  163  33.0 (30–44)    103  23.0 (20–32)  0.200 
  Pre-SARS  90  39.5 (31–51)    61  29.0 (20–50)  0.161 
  Post-SARS  73  29.0 (25–37)    42  21.5 (17–32)  0.613 
Geographic location             
  Africa  85  37.0 (29–51)    41  31.0 (23–57)  0.733 
  Americas  13  30.0 (21–63)    12  25.0 (20–34)  0.568 
  Eastern Mediterranean  24  41.0 (23–51)    9  31.0 (16–82)  0.903 
  Europe  11  31.0 (23–79)    9  20.0 (13–184)  0.909 
  Southeast Asia  8  28.0 (10–62)    11  14.0 (11–51)  0.431 
  Western Pacific  22  26.0 (12–52)    21  18.0 (13–33)  0.789 
*Bootstrapping with 10,000 replicates was used to calculate 95% CIs for median values. SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.News during this 14-year period were initially reported by 
informal information sources.
Traditional governmental public health reporting 
mechanisms remain an integral source for outbreak 
information, accounting for almost two-thirds of all initial 
reports over this period. Our results also show that these 
sources made statistically signiﬁ   cant improvements in 
reporting early warnings of outbreak threats more rapidly 
to the public, which might result in part from a shift toward 
automated, electronic methods that improve the timeliness 
of communication (12,13). It is possible that enhancements 
in nongovernmental outbreak reporting systems also 
contributed to improvements in governmental outbreak 
reporting timeliness over the study period, but we were 
unable to test this assumption with the current data.
This study has potential limitations. We encountered 
difﬁ   culty in selecting and consistently applying criteria 
to determine the initial source of public communication 
from ProMED-mail reports, which could have resulted in 
misclassiﬁ  cation bias. Although other reporting systems 
that use informal information exist, they either lack a 
publicly available archive (for example, Global Public 
Health Intelligence Network) (14) or their database did not 
cover the entire study period (for example, HealthMap) 
(15). According to Heymann, et al., 65% of outbreaks 
recognized by WHO are ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed by informal sources 
(4), a proportion we did not ﬁ  nd. Some outbreak reports 
were excluded because of missing data. We were able 
to internally validate the data that remained, but these 
exclusions limited the study’s statistical power. Finally, 
use of outbreak reports collected from the WHO Disease 
Outbreak News might limit the generalizability of our 
ﬁ  ndings to all infectious disease outbreaks. Despite these 
limitations, our data highlight the value of nongovernmental 
sources as an integral resource for providing timely 
information about global infectious disease threats, and 
demonstrate the signiﬁ  cant improvements in the timeliness 
of outbreak reporting made by governmental sources.
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